Is the sensible an illusion? The revisited ontology of the Sophist


  • Luca Pitteloud


In this paper we argue that, in the Sophist, Plato provides the reader some elements about a revision of his ontology behind the discussion about the nature of non-being. We would want to show that the analysis of the notion of image gives some indications concerning the nature of the sensible, which is usually described as an image of the intelligible.


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Biografia do Autor

Luca Pitteloud

Luca Pitteloud
UnB – Archai UNESCO Chair, Brasília
November 28-29, 2013, João Pessoa, UFPB


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Pitteloud, L. (2014). Is the sensible an illusion? The revisited ontology of the Sophist. Aufklärung: Journal of Philosophy, 1(1), p.21–32. Recuperado de